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CHOICE OF LAW-MASS DISASTER
CASES INVOLVING DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
F. LEE BAILEY*
AARON J. BRODER**
N OWHERE is the need for a functional and flexible approach
to the problem of choice of law more urgent than in the
mass disaster aircraft cases involving wrongful death and deva-
stating personal injuries.1 Since these cases will primarily be de-
cided in the federal court system, they are subject to the federal
venue provisions and will inevitably fall within multidistrict litiga-
tion rules.' Thus, when a case is commenced in a given district, it
may either be: (i) transferred pursuant to section 1404(a)3 for
all purposes including trial; or (ii) when the case is determined to
* B.A., Harvard College; J.D., Boston University Law School; Attorney at
Law, Massachusetts bar.
** B.S. cum laude, City College of the City of New York; LL.B., New York
University School of Law, Attorney at Law, New York bar. The authors grate-
fully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Mr. Seymour Madow, B.A., Rut-
gers University; J.D., New York University School of Law; Attorney at Law,
New York bar; member of authors' law firm.
1 See note 49 infra. Add the following to the citations of authority: D. Cavers,
Re-Restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts in 20TH CENTURY
COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAw 349, 357-58 (1961). See Ehrenzweig, Guest
Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under
all Foreseeable and Insurable Laws, 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970) provides in part: "(a) When civil actions involv-
ing one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts,
such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that
transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and wit-
nesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each ac-
tion so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion
of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless
it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may
separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand
any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded."
'28 U.S.C. 5 1404(a) (1970).
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have been commenced in the wrong district, the case may be trans-
ferred to any district where the action should have been properly
brought under section 1406;' or (iii) the case may be transferred
to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings
under section 1407,' then remanded at or before the conclusion
of the pretrial proceedings from the transferee district.
Notwithstanding these transfer provisions, the choice of law
rule of the original transferor forum remains when venue was
properly laid initially.' Although as a matter of federal policy a
case may be transferred to a more convenient court,' those rights
that the parties have acquired pursuant to the laws of the juris-
diction where the case was originally brought remain intact in all
respects. The only change effected by the transfer of the case for
the convenience of the judicial system is a change of location.
Thus, when a case is transferred pursuant to section 1404(a) or
section 1407, the law of the forum where the action was originally
brought governs the rights of the parties Furthermore, the orig-
inal forum may select the law of any jurisdiction having substantial
contact with the issue in the case.'
Thus, except when the action was originally brought in an im-
proper jurisdiction, the rights of the litigant become fixed in ac-
cordance with the law of the forum, including the choice of law
rule of that forum."0 It is clear that the selection of the forum
where to bring the action is of paramount importance. Moreover,
the provisions of federal law with respect to change of venue" and
multidistrict litigation" do not derogate from the significance of
the selection of the forum made by counsel.
428 U.S.C. § 1406 (1970).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
'Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
7Id.
8 Id.
'Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962). See, Crider v. Zurrich
Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964);
Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Griffin v.
McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
10Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
1 See notes 3 and 8 supra.
12 See note 2 supra.
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I. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHOICE OF LAW RULE
To illustrate the selection process, assume that an attorney has
been retained by the estate of the person killed in an airplane crash
occurring in Massachusetts. At the time of death, the deceased
and his survivors are domiciliaries of New York, jurisdiction and
venue may properly be laid in either Massachusetts or New York."3
Assume further that the investigation by the attorney discloses
that Massachusetts has a maximum limitation on recoveries in
wrongful death cases' and is based on the degree of culpability,
while New York has unlimited recovery." Upon discovering that
the New York courts will not apply the Massachusetts rule limiting
damages in wrongful death cases" he would, of course, select New
York as the forum.
Although this is a simple illustration and the significance of
New York being selected as the forum for this hypothetical law-
suit is easily ascertained, the cases arising out of mass disasters
involve issues far more complex and require closer scrutiny to
select properly the forum to institute the action. A striking example
is Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc." which involved an aircraft
that crashed in Italy but was manufactured and sold in the state
of Washington. The suit was instituted against the air carrier for
negligence and against the manufacturer for breach of warranty.
The law of the state of Washington was favorable to the plaintiff
concerning the breach of warranty claims both on the substantive
law8 and on the statute of limitations. In addition the law of Italy
was favorable concerning the negligence claim. 9 The Illinois court,
where the action was brought, applied the law of Italy on the
negligence claim because Italy was the place of injury. Since the
"8 See note 31 infra (referring here to jurisdiction over the subject matter and
assuming that jurisdiction over the defendant can be obtained in the place of the
domicile of the plaintiff).
1 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, S5 1, 2 (as in effect 1958).
isN.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW, Article 5, 55 5-4.3 (1971).
"6 See note 31 infra.
" 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. 111. 1969).
18 Id.
19 Id.
'"The court in Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D.
Ill. 1969), relied upon Klaxton v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487
(1941), and Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
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state of Washington was the place of manufacturer, sale and de-
livery of the aircraft, the Illinois court applied Washington law
on the breach of warranty claim.' In addition the court held that
the law of the domicile of the deceased at the time of death would
govern the damages claim." The defendants were eventually held
liable."
Clearly the court in Manos' applied a flexible standard by first
isolating the issues and then determining the law of the several
jurisdictions that would apply in resolving that issue. If the case
had been brought in a jurisdiction that adheres to the outmoded
and rigid approach" that postulates the application of the law of
the place of injury in all respects, then the ultimate result might
have been disastrous to the plaintiffs. Thus because the law of the
forum originally selected plays such a significant role in the ulti-
mate determination of the rights of the accident victim, a thorough
investigation is essential to ascertain whether a full measure of
recovery can be obtained under the substantive and choice of law
rules of the jurisdiction."
For this reason it is necessary to understand the significance of
the choice of law rules of lex loci, the "significant contacts," and
the "governmental interest" as they may determine the applicable
law in a given case under the particular choice of law rule of the
forum where the action has been instituted.
II. CHOICE OF LAW RULE
Over a decade ago the choice of law rule was that the law of
the state where the injury occurred governed tort actions and the
law of the state where the contract was made governed contract
21 See note 17 supra at 1176, citing Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries,
Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964).
22 1d. at 1173.
2 Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
"See note 17 supra.
25 For a discussion of this issue see Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d
727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). Reviews of Leading Cases, Griffith v. United Air-
lines, 31 AM. TR. LAw. L.J. 546 (1965).
21See Stubblefield v. Johnson-Fagg, Inc., 379 F.2d 270 (10th Cir. 1967);
George v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 332 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
904 (1967); Murphy v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 30 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 378 U.S. 906 (1964); Schultz v. Tecumseh, 310 F.2d 426
(6th Cir. 1962); Krause v. Republic Aviation Corp., 196 F. Supp. 856 (E.D.N.Y.
1961); Kellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
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actions. 7 But the inequities engendered by this rigid concept, which
was outmoded by the advancing technology of the society, im-
pelled the courts to seek other standards to conform the law with
the changing patterns of life. Thus the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, struck out against
the ritualistic thinking of the nineteenth century in Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc.,8 by holding that the New York courts
were not bound by the Massachusetts maximum limitation on
damages on wrongful death of 15,000 dollars, 8 notwithstanding
the accident having occurred in Massachusetts. More significant,
however, was the court's recognition of the need for an articulate
selection of laws governing multistate transactions:
The field of conflict of laws, the most underdeveloped in our
jurisprudence from a practical standpoint, is just now breaking
loose from the ritualistic thinking of the last century. Recent
opinions of the Supreme Court and the great wave of academic
writing reinforce this trend toward flexible and articulate selec-
tion of the laws governing multistate transactions. The develop-
ment will be stillborn if we impose inflexible constitutional stric-
tures in the name of national unity, restrictions which could not
be repaired by state or federal legislation."
This search for flexibility has been difficult and fraught with
confusion. In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc." the New York
court held that the maximum recovery of 15,000 dollars in wrong-
ful death actions in Massachusetts was offensive to public policy.
Since the plane crashed in Massachusetts, the traditional lex loci
rule would cause obvious injustice. Indeed, the court in Kilberg
stated: "Modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to sub-
ject the traveling citizen of this state to the varying laws of other
states through and over which they move.""
The court found an expedient method of applying the public
policy principle of full and just compensation to accident victims
2"The significance of the choice-of-law rule adopted by the forum is well
demonstrated in Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
28309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
29 Id. at 555 n.1.
30 Id. at 563.
19 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
32 id. at 135.
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without destroying the accepted lex loci rule. The court avoided
a direct confrontation with the anachronistic lex loci doctrine by
treating the measure of damages as a procedural matter controlled
by the law of the forum. 3 But the significance of Kilberg rests in
the recognition that public policy of the forum overrides conven-
tional configurations of the conflict of law rules.
Viewed in this light, the cases that follow Kilberg applied a new
principle, "grouping of contacts," as a criteria to be used in the
selection of the applicable law." But the "grouping of contacts"
principle was actually a new version of the older approach to the
conflicts of law problem. Thus the rigid application of the "group-
ing of contacts" theory eliminate one rigid rule (lex loci) and the
substitution of the a new one (grouping of contacts). The same
infirmity existing under the old rule began to be manifest in the
new one. Although the courts gave pious recognition of the need
for flexibility in applying "grouping of contacts""+ theory and though
this theory was modified by the term "significant,"'" nevertheless
the courts persisted in mechanically counting contacts to ascertain
the applicable jurisdictional law in a given case.
An illustration of the dilemma that ensued from the mechanical
application of the grouping contact theory may be found in
Babcock v. Jackson when the New York Superior Court announced
that justice and fairness would best be achieved in tort cases with
multistate contacts by giving controlling effect to the jurisdiction
that has the greatest concern with the issues involved in the law-
suit because of its contact with the occurrence or the parties." In
Babcock, the court abandoned the traditional lex loci rule in favor
of the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory. In
addition, the court roundly condemned any choice of law rule that
33 Id. at 137.
1 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1963); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d
591 (1966). A fine discussion of the historical development of the movement in
New York of the choice-of-law doctrine, "all grouping of contacts" to the "gov-
ernmental interests" is found in the concurring opinion of Judge Breitel in Neu-
meier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
"' See note 37 infra.36 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466
(1965).
3 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
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would require the application of the law of the jurisdiction based
merely upon the fortuitous circumstance of the wrong or injury
occurring in that jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the Babcock decision
compared the relative contacts and interest of New York (the
forum) with Ontario, Canada (the place of injury). Thus it ap-
plied the law of New York because the action involved injuries
sustained by a New York domiciliary, the defendant was also a
New York domiciliary, the automobile involved was garaged,
licensed and insured in New York and the accident, which occurred
in Ontario, was an incident of a weekend journey that began and
was to end in New York. In effect, the Babcock decision set the
stage for the contact counting that later transpired.38
In the 1965 case of Dym v. Gordon" the court held that the
Colorado guest statute would be applied by the New York court
notwithstanding that the parties to the action were New York
domiciliaries. There the facts selected as criteria for the application
of the Colorado guest statute were: the accident occurred in Colo-
rado; the parties were summer students at the University of
Colorado and had arrived there at separate times; there had been
no arrangement between defendant and the plaintiff to meet in
Colorado; there was no prior arrangement made in New York for
plaintiff to ride in defendant's automobile; and the accident oc-
curred during an automobile trip that began and terminated within
the borders of Colorado.
Significantly, the court held that the factual contacts required
the application of Colorado law and further that public policy, per
se, plays no part in a choice of law problem."0 As a result, these
cases illustrate the difficulty in applying the "grouping of contacts"
theory because of the tendency to mechanically count the number
of contacts and arrive with the objective criteria for the choice of
law.
The terrible injustice of this rigid mechanical application of the
"grouping of contacts" theory can at once be seen in comparing
Dym4" with Miller v. Miller."' In Miller, a New York resident was
"See note 34 supra.
"16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).40 Id. at 469.
41See note 39 supra.
- 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S. 734 (1968).
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killed while riding in a car on a business trip to Maine. The question
presented was whether the New York forum would apply the
maximum limitation of 20,000 dollars on recovery in a wrongful
death action pursuant to the laws of Maine. The court admitted
with admirable candor that the rule, which had evolved under
various headings such as "grouping of contacts" and "center of
gravity," lacked precise consistency.' The facts or contacts con-
sidered significant would be those that defined the interests of the
forum state as relating to the conflicting law. Contact counting was
specifically rejected. In addition, the court refused to apply the
Maine statute because of New York's concern for compensating
the wife and children of the New York decedent for the loss of
their breadwinner."
Thus, in Miller the favorable law of the forum was applied not-
withstanding that the defendants were residents of Maine, the pro-
jected trip was planned and was to take place wholly in Maine, the
trip was connected with Maine business, the automobile was reg-
istered and garaged in Maine and the accident occurred in Maine.
By any fair interpretation, the plaintiff in Dym was as entitled
to the same choice of law as was the plaintiff in Miller.
The true significance of Babcock was not articulated, however,
until the 1969 decision of Tooker v. Lopez." While the court in
Babcock announced that the "grouping of contacts" theory does
not require contact counting, nevertheless it did just that and the
result was a mechanical application of the doctrine. Finally, in
Tooker, the court announced that the public policy of the forum
state concerning the issue in the lawsuit would determine the choice
of law as long as the legitimate interest of another state is not
countervened.
A close analysis of the facts in Tooker reveals the rejection of
contact counting as a criteria to be used in choice of law." The
plaintiff was the passenger in a car being driven by a classmate
when the accident occurred on a pleasure trip in Michigan. In
applying the law of the forum, the court refused to indulge in
"Id. at 737.
"Id. at 739.
"24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
°See Thomas v. United Air Lines, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 714, 249 N.E.2d 755,
301 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1969).
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contact counting and instead plainly stated that the forum state had
a paramount interest in seeing that the deceased adequately re-
covered. The court concluded that: "To state the matter simply,
we are concerned with rational and just rules and not with merely
simple rules."'
In Tooker, both the plaintiff's intestate and the defendant's
intestate were students at Michigan State University, they were
both New York domiciliaries and the vehicle involved was reg-
istered and insured in New York. The Tooker opinion, however,
turned on the consideration of New York public policy with respect
to compensation for injured accident victims. More recently, the
New York Court of Appeals in Neumeier v. Kuehner" applied the
law of Ontario in a case that involved a domiciliary of Ontario
who was killed in an automobile owned and driven by a New York
resident. The accident occurred in Ontario.
The facts in Neumeier are readily distinguishable from those of
Tooker, since in Tooker, both parties were domiciliaries of New
York. Thus, the Neumeier case would be unremarkable except for
the court's extensive statement with respect to the developing choice
of law issue. The court explained that in Tooker, New York had a
vital interest in protecting its own residents, injured in a foreign
state, against unfair or unanachronistic statutes of that foreign
state. But New York had no legitimate interests in ignoring the
public policy of that foreign jurisdiction when the plaintiff-guest is
domiciled and injured in the foreign jurisdiction. Thus, the New
York court acknowledged the significance of its public policy in
determining the choice of law that it would apply. It insisted, how-
ever, that the public policy considerations applied only to its own
domiciliary.
The New York court in Neumeier reiterated the wisdom of dis-
carding the single, all-encompassing rule of lex loci because it was
too broad and resulted in injustice. Chief Judge Fuld stated in the
opinion, however, that there is no reason why choice of law rules
more narrow than those previously devised, should not be de-
veloped.
Thus, by drawing upon the concurring opinion in Tooker, Judge
Fuld writes for the majority in Neumeier outlining the following
41 See note 45 supra at 579 n.16.
- 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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set of rules that are to be applied in cases involving guest-pas-
sengers:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in
the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state
should control and determine the standard of care which the host
owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile
and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he
should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would
be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the vic-
tim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the
state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver
who has come into that state should not-in the absence of spe-
cial circumstances-be permitted to interpose the law of his state
as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are
domiciled in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical.
Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state
where the accident occurred but not if it can be shown that dis-
placing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant
substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working
of the multistate system or producing great uncertainty for liti-
gants. (Citation omitted.) "9
In dissenting, Judge Bergan commented, in part, as follows:
Neither because of 'interest' nor 'contact' nor any other defensible
ground is it justifiable to say in a court of law that the rights of
one man whose suit is accepted shall be adjudged differently on
the merits on the basis of where he happens to live."0
The point is that no court of law should feel constrained to
apply a rule that is plainly contrary to justice as defined by public
policy. In an emerging era of population mobility, heretofore un-
paralleled, courts applying doctrines doing violence to justice may
reasonably expect that the community will find other means of
resolving disputes without recourse to courts. When the announced
" Id. Chief Judge Fuld cites the following authorities as an indication of the
need for a greater degree of predictability and uniformity: Cavers, THE CHOICE OF
LAw PROCESS, 121-22 (1968); Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 548, 555, 561-62 (1971); Reese, Choice of Law: Rule or Ap-
proach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 321 et seq. (1972); Rosenberg, Comments on
Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.A. L. REV. 641, 642, 646-47 (1968).
5031 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) (dissenting opin-
ion).
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public policy of the state is to allow for adequate and just com-
pensation to the innocent tort victims, how can the court find
justification for the contravention of its policy through the applica-
tion of narrow strictures and rigid rules? In the field of choice of
law the answer to this rhetorical question is to be found in the
adoption of a flexible and functional approach that allows maxi-
mum application of rules consistent with public policy.
III. THE FLEXIBLE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
The flexible and functionable approach, as recited in the cases,
primarily depends upon the public policy of the forum. When that
public policy contemplates full and just compensation to innocent
tort victims, then the law of the jurisdiction that provides for ful-
fillment of its public policy should be applied. In other words, the
choice of law is the handmaiden of justice and justice finds its
definition in terms of the public policy of the forum.1
In multidistrict airplane crash litigation, the attorneys must first
closely analyze the choice of law problem of all the potential juris-
dictions to select a forum that properly and adequately compen-
sates the innocent victim of the airplane crash. If counsel is ulti-
mately constrained to bring the case in a jurisdiction that has not
adopted the modern flexible approach, which seeks criteria for the
application of the jurisdictional law conforming to the public policy
of the forum state, then it becomes the obligation of the attorney
to fight for a change in the law to achieve this purpose. It is no
longer acceptable to denude the victims of their right to full and
just compensation by reason of the arbitrary application of a rigid
principle governing choice of law.
"1Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967);
Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970); Reviews of
Leading Cases, Griffith v. United Air Lines, 31 AM. TR. LAW. L.J. 546 (1965);
Comment, Products Liability and the Choice of Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1452,
1459 (1965); Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections
on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 141 (1967).
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